On Wed May 6, 4-6pm UK time (in the Law Library, and online), Connie Rosati (U. of Texas, Austin) will give an SCLP seminar titled “Two Concepts of Law”. Click here to attend the session via Teams.

Abstract: Hart, and legal positivists more generally, have one view about the nature of law, and natural law theorists have another. There are then (at least) two accounts (or families of accounts) of the nature of law: echoing the title of Hart’s landmark book, The Concept of Law, we might say there are two “concepts” of law. Legal philosophers tend to think that only one of these views can be correct; and it would seem one of them must be, given that they are logically contradictory. According to legal positivism, it is not a necessary condition on a rule being law (or a legal system being a legal system) that it comport with morality; according to natural law theory, comporting with morality is a necessary condition.

Even so, these different concepts of law may do different kinds of normative work. Legal positivism and natural law theory have significant overlap, and though they ultimately part company, both may have a role to play in our legal and social practices. In this essay, I explore how this might be and explain why certain objections that might be thought to defeat natural law theory or legal positivism do not succeed.